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Bill 10, if Enacted, Will Install a Constitutional Dictatorship and Undermine 









Zambia has made several attempts to elaborate a democratic constitution that promotes good 
governance, inclusiveness, citizen participation, accountability, and the separation of powers 
between the three arms of government-parliament, the judiciary, and the executive. Success has been 
elusive largely because the processes used have been inappropriate for consensus building. The 
latest attempt, the Constitution Amendment Bill No. 10 of 2019, which came out of a ruling party 
dominated constitutional conference, is presently before parliament. The constitutional conference 
excluded key stake holders such as the main opposition party and civil society. The paper critically 
examines the contents of Bill 10 and its constitutionality. It argues that Bill 10 removes parliamentary 
oversight over the executive and aims to create a constitutional dictatorship. The paper further 
argues that Bill 10 is unconstitutional as it seeks to alter the basic structure of the 2016 Zambian 
constitution. The fundamental basic structure of the 2016 constitution is the separation of powers 
between the three arms of government-parliament, the judiciary, and the executive. The paper argues 
that while parliament has wide powers to amend the constitution, that power does not include the 





Most independent African constitutions, crafted by departing colonial powers, over-
centralised power in the presidency to the detriment of governance and development 
without adequate checks and balances. With the advent of the world wide movement 
towards democratisation in Africa and elsewhere, the post-1998 constitution-making 
processes focus on promoting democratisation and participation in governance, 
institutionalising accountability, and establishing checks and balances in constitutional 
arrangements (Hatchard, 2004). This requires devising governmental arrangements that are 
meant to do away with old colonial undemocratic constitutional practices. Examples of 
successful constitutional processes include Benin, Namibia, South Africa, and Kenya while 
Tanzania and Zambia represent failed processes (Miller, 2010).  The interrelationship 
Ndulo, ‘Bill 10 and Constitutional Dictatorship in Zambia’ 
 
 32 
between good governance and development is widely recognised throughout the world. 
Without good governance, there can be no meaningful development (Ndulo, 2003). 
  After several attempts, Zambia has failed to develop a democratic constitution which 
ensures that its citizens fully participate in the governance of the state and that those in 
power are accountable to the people that elected them (Ndulo, 2019).  This is because the 
processes adopted to develop a new constitution have been deeply flawed. In all the previous 
efforts, including the current one, there has been an attempt by the ruling party to 
manipulate the process and use it to achieve its own goals. The processes have been 
dominated by the ruling party, lack any philosophical approach to constitution making and 
are not guided by any constitutional principles. For a constitution-making process to be 
successful, it must be inclusive. That is, it must be representative of the people of the country, 
i.e. it must include all stakeholders. In constitution-making undertakings, the process is as 
important as the substance (Miller, 2010). 
In 2019 the Patriotic Front (PF), the ruling party in Zambia, initiated a process to 
implement major amendments to the 2016 constitution on the pretext of addressing lacunas 
in the constitution. The process has culminated in the introduction in Parliament of the 2019 
Constitution Amendment Bill No. 10 of 2019. The process that led to Bill 10 was deeply 
flawed.  It was unrepresentative and was boycotted by several opposition parties including 
the main opposition party, United Party for National Development (UPND). In this article, it 
is argued that Bill 10 is manipulative and attempts to deceive the people of Zambia and create 
a dictatorship under the guise of constitutional reform. It is a ploy to seek legitimacy for the 
adoption of radical constitutional reforms aimed at destroying the basic structure of the 
2016 Zambian constitution.  Bill 10 is designed to remove parliamentary oversight over the 
presidency and thereby install a constitutional dictatorship. It attempts to manipulate the 
electoral system to ensure that the ruling party remains in power in perpetuity. Additionally, 
it is argued that Bill 10 is unconstitutional as it undermines the basic structure of the 
constitution based on the doctrine of the separations of powers. In a constitutional 
democracy, parliamentary power to legislate is not unlimited. It is given by the constitution 
and therefore subject to the constitution and it certainly does not include the power to 
subvert the constitution.  
The article is organised into three sections. The first section examines the role of the 
constitution in a democratic society. The second section critically examines the proposed 
amendments and the third section examines the constitutionality of the proposed 
amendments in the context of the constitutional principle of the basic structure doctrine 
developed by the Indian Supreme Court and adopted in several other jurisdictions.    
 
2. Constitution and the Rule of Law 
 
The constitution of any state is a body of fundamental principles that constitute the legal 
basis on which a state is governed. It determines the powers and duties of the government 
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and guarantees certain rights to the people. It is the highest organising document of the state. 
It provides the cornerstone and framework upon which the edifice of the state is created. It 
is the basic law – the grundnorm – and as such the source of legitimate conferral of state 
powers and their exercise. As the Constitutional Court observed in its recent decision 
involving the Speaker of the National Assembly, all institutions and the high offices created 
by the constitution are themselves subservient to the constitution. All institutions and 
governance systems owe their being to the constitution and the powers conferred on them 
can only be exercised in line with the constitution (Kambwili v. Attorney General, 2019).  
The constitution has a basic structure, and the separation of powers doctrine is a 
fundamental norm of the structure. It should be understood as part of the institutional 
balance between coordinate branches of government. The constitution is therefore a 
document of special character – subject only to the ultimate will of the people and not to the 
whimsical accumulation of powers and privileges of any individual. It is important to 
emphasise the point that the constitution is supreme over all institutions, including the 
parliament and the judiciary. That is what is meant by the concept of constitutionalism and 
the rule of law.  
 
3. What is Wrong with the Proposed Amendments? 
 
The objects of Bill 10 would seem innocuous to an untrained eye. But this is a deeply 
manipulative document that seeks to establish a constitutional dictatorship in Zambia. This 
should startle anybody who deeply cares about constitutionalism and democratic 
governance in Zambia.  In this section the paper draws attention to some salient and far-
reaching changes inherent in the proposed amendments. It is hoped that the discussion on 
the amendments will demonstrate that this effort has structure, purpose, and strategy 
behind it, which is to neutralise all levers of checks and install an unaccountable executive. 
 
3.1 Amendments too Broad 
 
There are numerous amendments – dealing with almost every aspect of state powers and 
public life in the country. It pertains not only to the principles and values of the Constitution 
of Zambia, but also deals with the National Assembly including its membership, dissolution, 
the period of hearing, determination of the hearing of presidential election petitions, 
creation of office of deputy minister, functions of public protector and banking and the 
Auditor General.  Moreover, there is an omnibus clause which provides for the enactment of 
legislation and statutory instruments: “for matters connected with, or incidental to, the 
foregoing.” (See paragraph “p” of the AGs proposal attached to the bill as introduced in 
parliament.)  
The proposed amendments are too broad and overreaching. Zambians might as well 
look for a new constitution instead of these broad sweeping amendments with no direct 
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gains for democracy. To really have a meaningful deliberation on all these provisions is 
doubtful, thus it is fair to assume that the government wants to sneak in changes to the 
constitution without the possibility of thorough examination. This may well explain the 
conflation of all manner of issues including banking and fiscal policy into this proposed 
amendment. 
 
3.2 Time and Timing 
 
It is apparent that the time and timing of this amendment is rather suspect. Elections are just 
around the corner and the attempt to hurry through some fundamental amendments to the 
electoral process is suspicious to put it mildly. It would seem that the aim is rather parochial. 
To avoid this possibility, issues that involve qualification and disqualification for 
participating at any level of the electoral process should not be hurriedly passed as a 
constitutional amendment.  
 
3.3 Removal of President on Grounds of Incapacity 
 
The instant provision in Article 107 of the Constitution of Zambia provides that: “107 (1) A 
Member of Parliament, supported by at least one third of the Members of Parliament, may 
move a motion for the investigation of the physical or mental capacity of the President to 
perform executive functions.” (Emphasis supplied).  
The proposed amendment says “Article 107 of the Constitution is amended by the 
deletion of the words “physical or mental” wherever the words appear.” (See Article 31, lines 
5-9 of the proposed Amendment, emphasis supplied). Zambians may well ask: what is the 
essence of stopping parliament from enquiring into the physical or mental health of the 
president even if such a president can no longer perform the duties of the high office of the 
president of Zambia? One thing is clear here, the present government and her coterie are 
envisaging a Zambia where even a vegetative president would not and cannot be removed 
from office since parliament cannot inquire into the health status of such a president. This 
applies mutatis mutandis to the Vice President as well. This is dangerous for democracy 
because nobody in the land and no organ of the state can investigate the health of the two 
principal officers of the state—the president and his or her vice.  
 
3.4 Impeachment of the President/Vice-President 
 
The extant provision in the Constitution of Zambia regarding impeachment of the president 
is as contained in Article 108.  Article 108. (1)  provides that “A Member of Parliament, 
supported by at least one third of the Members of Parliament, may move a motion for the 
impeachment of the President alleging that the President has committed – (a) a violation of 
a provision of this Constitution or other law; (b) a crime under international law; or (c) gross 
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misconduct. (2) The motion, moved in accordance with clause (1), shall specify the 
particulars of the allegation. (3) Where a motion, moved in accordance with clause (1), is 
supported, in the National Assembly, by a resolution of two-thirds of the Members of 
Parliament – (a) the Speaker shall, within forty-eight hours of the adoption of the resolution, 
inform the Chief Justice of the resolution; and (b) the Chief Justice shall immediately inform 
the President of the resolution, whereupon the President shall cease to perform the 
executive functions and the Vice President shall perform the executive functions, except the 
power to – (i) make an appointment; or (ii) dissolve the National Assembly. (4) The Chief 
Justice shall, within seven days of being informed of the resolution of the National Assembly, 
appoint a tribunal, in consultation with the Judicial Service Commission, which shall consist 
of a chairperson and not less than two other members from among persons who hold, have 
held or qualify to hold, the office of judge. (5) The tribunal appointed under clause (4) shall, 
within thirty days of its appointment – (a) investigate the matter relating to the 
impeachment of the President; and (b) report to the Chief Justice as to whether or not the 
particulars of the allegations specified in the motion have been substantiated.”  
Under Article 108 (6), The President has the right to appear and be represented 
before the tribunal during its investigation. (7) The Chief Justice shall, on receipt of the 
report referred to in clause (5) (b), immediately submit the report to the National Assembly. 
(8) Where the tribunal reports that the particulars of an allegation against the President – 
(a) is not substantiated, the National Assembly shall, on a motion supported by the votes of 
not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament, taken by secret ballot, resolve that – 
(i) the President did not commit the violations specified in the motion; and (ii) further 
proceedings shall not be taken with respect to the allegation; or (b) is substantiated, the 
National Assembly shall, on a motion supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of 
the Members of Parliament, taken by secret ballot, resolve that the President has committed 
the violations specified in the motion and that the President should cease to hold office 
forthwith. (emphasis supplied). (9) The President shall, on the passing of a resolution in 
accordance with— (a) clause (7) (a), resume to perform the executive functions; or (b) 
clause (7) (b), cease to hold office and be amenable to prosecution without the need to lift 
the immunity under Article 98. (10) Where a motion is moved in accordance with clause (1), 
the President shall not dissolve Parliament. (11) This Article applies to the Vice-President.” 
(Impeachment of President Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) (No. 2 of 2016 47)). 
The provision above by itself is tedious because, it is not easy to muster the number 
of parliamentarians required to impeach a president, it is therefore generally fair since it 
provides for many measures to guarantee fairness to any occupant of the office of President 
or Vice- President. The now proposed amendment seeks to make it impossible to even 
contemplate impeaching the president or vice president. Hence, it has whittled down the 
capacity of the constitution to check the powers of the Presidency or seek accountability 
from any occupier of that high office. Note particularly clause 7, 8(a) and 9 of Article 108 as 
they are very significant to the proposed amendment.  
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For the avoidance of doubt the proposed amendments states “Article 108 of the 
Constitution is amended by the deletion of – (a) clause (8)(a) and the substitution therefor 
of the following: (a) is not substantiated, the National Assembly shall not take further 
proceedings in respect of the allegation; or; and (b) by the deletion of clause (9) and the 
substitution therefor of the following: (9) The President shall, on the passing of the 
resolution in accordance with – (a) clause (8)(a), resume to perform the executive functions; 
or (b) clause (8)(b), cease to hold office and be amenable to prosecution without the need 
to lift the immunity under Article 98. ((emphasis supplied) see Article 32 (paragraph 10-24) 
of proposed amendment).  
What this provision does is to remove the capacity of parliament to vote by secret 
ballot to resolve whether the findings of a tribunal brought before parliament substantiates 
the allegations against the president or otherwise. The legislative intention in the existing 
law is that parliament should have the final say via secret ballot as to whether the findings 
have made out the allegation or not. To remove this power is to make it possible for findings 
of a tribunal to have the air of finality. It removes the capacity of the peoples’ representative 
– the parliament to ratify or vary the outcome of such tribunals. I need not say how much 
this consolidates powers in the hands of the president and also puts pressure on any 
committee or tribunal that might be asked to investigate allegations of misconduct. Indeed, 
the president can manipulate, or intimidate both the constitution and findings of such a 
tribunal. Additionally, the members of parliament would no longer be protected from 
retaliation as the secret ballot is removed.  
 
3.5 Tenure of Office of Vice-President and Vacancy 
 
The conspiracy inherent in this proposed amendment is further highlighted in the 
examination of the proposed amendments regarding tenure of office and the vacancy in the 
office of president and vice-president respectively. Like the Catiline Conspiracy, there is an 
attempt by the ruling oligarchy to steal, expropriate, and personalise the high offices of the 
President and Vice-President of Zambia.  
The existing Constitutional Provision in Article 111 states: “111. (1) The term of office 
for a Vice-President is five years. (2) A Vice-President shall hold office from the date the Vice-
president-elect is sworn into office and ending on the date the next President-elect is sworn 
into office. (3) A person who has twice held the office of Vice-President shall not be selected 
as a running mate. (4) The office of Vice-President becomes vacant if the Vice-president – (a) 
dies; (b) resigns by notice in writing to the President; (c) otherwise ceases to hold office 
under Article 81,107 or 108; or (d) assumes the office of President. (5) Where a vacancy 
occurs in the office of Vice-President, except as provided under Article 81, the President shall 
appoint another person to be Vice-President and the National Assembly shall, by a resolution 
supported by the votes of not less than two thirds of the Members of Parliament, approve 
the appointment of that person as Vice-President. (6) The person who assumes office as 
Ndulo, ‘Bill 10 and Constitutional Dictatorship in Zambia’ 
 
 37 
Vice-President, in accordance with clause (5), shall serve for the unexpired term of office and 
be deemed for the purposes of clause (3) – (a) to have served a full term as Vice-President 
if, at the date on which the Vice-President assumed office, more than three years remain 
before the date of the next general election; or (b) not to have served a term of office as Vice-
President if, at the date on which the Vice-President assumed office, less than three years 
remain before the date of the next general elections.” (emphasis supplied).  
The proposed amendment states “Article 111 of the Constitution is amended – (a) by 
the deletion of clauses (3) and (6); and (b) by the renumbering of clauses (4) and (5) as 
clauses (3) and (4), respectively” (See Article 33 of proposed Amendment).  
Tragically, this proposed amendment seeks to eliminate tenure limits because the 
person who assumes office as Vice President will no longer be serving the unexpired term of 
office. Equally, a person who has served twice as Vice-President will no longer be disqualified 
from serving a third, fourth, fifth, or infinite term as Vice-President. The ramifications of this 
for multi-party democracy and public accountability are totally unbelievable. Is this in the 
public interest? Why all these sweeping appropriations and consolidation of powers in the 
presidency? Zambia aspires to consolidate democracy and not to install a dictatorship.  
 
3.6 Functions of the Vice-President 
 
As provided in Article 112 (1) of the Zambian Constitution, the Vice-President shall be 
answerable to the President in the Performance of the functions of Vice-President. “(2) The 
Vice-President shall – (a) perform the functions that are assigned to the Vice-President by 
the President; (b) perform the executive functions during the periods specified in this 
Constitution; and (c) assume the office of President as specified in Article 106 (5).” Bill 10 
proposes that “The Constitution is amended by deletion of the subheading immediately after 
Article 112 and the substitution therefor of the following: “Cabinet, Minister, Provincial 
Minister and Deputy Minister”” (See article 34 – repeal and replacement of Article 112).  
In effect, this provision renders the office of the Vice-President powerless and makes 
the occupant a mere puppet of the president. The Vice-President cannot take steps on behalf 
of the state or perform the duties of the president even in the president’s absence. This can 
be very dangerous in case of sudden death, impeachment or other human misfortune against 
the occupant of the office of the president – especially if that person is incapacitated by 
mental or bodily infirmity to perform the duties of that office. The political uncertainty which 
this might engender in a complex society like Zambia is unfathomable. Note that Article 106 
of the Constitution of Zambia provides that “the term of office for a President is five years 
which shall run concurrently with the term of Parliament, except that the term of office of 
President shall expire when the President-elect assumes office in accordance with Article 
105.”  
More so, Article 106(5) provides that “When a vacancy occurs in the office of 
President, except under Article 81 – (a) the Vice-President shall immediately assume the 
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office of President; or (b) if the Vice-President is unable for a reason to assume the office of 
President, the Speaker shall perform the executive functions, except the power to – (i) make 
an appointment; or (ii) dissolve the National Assembly; and a presidential election shall be 
held within sixty days after the occurrence of the vacancy.”  A careful and combined reading 
of the juxtaposed provisions directly above reveals the uncanny intentions of the proponents 
of Bill 10. If this provision goes through successfully what it means is that we would have 
effectively turned Zambia into a serfdom; the private estate of the president and his coterie 
of courtiers. It will endanger the peace and prosperity of Zambia.  
 
3.7 Mental and Physical Capacity of Ministers 
 
Article 116 (3) (f) of the Constitution of Zambia is of the intendment that the office of a 
minister can become vacant by reason of the fact that “the Minister has a mental or physical 
disability that makes the Minister incapable of performing the functions of that office.” Now 
Article 116 (3) of the Constitution is amended – (a) by the deletion of paragraph (f) and the 
substitution therefor of the following: (f) the Minister is legally disqualified from performing 
the functions of that office...”  
One is left wondering why the present administration seeks to legislate against health 
issues which are often beyond human control. If a minister by any stroke of fate loses mental 
or physical capacity to perform the functions of his/her office, is she/he expected to stay in 
office in perpetuity to the detriment of the Zambian state? It is beyond telling how the ardor 
of power and privilege can close the human mind to the fragility, frailty, and decay of human 
nature with time. This passionate embrace of power is an ill wind and Zambia cannot afford 
it at this period of her development. 
 
3.8 Appointment of Deputy Ministers 
 
Article 117 is amended to provide for the appointment of Deputy Ministers. The proposed 
amendment states “The Constitution is amended by the insertion of the following new Article 
immediately after Article 117: 117A. The President may appoint a prescribed number of 
Deputy Ministers as the President may consider necessary to assist Ministers in the 
performance of the Ministers functions and to exercise or to perform on behalf of Ministers 
functions of the Ministers that the President may authorize in that behalf.”  
Zambia is a poor state, thus the wisdom of enlarging the number of individuals who 
will be dependent on the state for their daily sustenance is doubtful. Putting it mildly, this 
seems like an opportunity to create jobs for political disciples who insult critics of the 
Government. Zambia’s limited resources need to be better invested towards the economic 
and social emancipation of the people. The hazardous health facilities, the poorly funded 
universities, and schools in general could do better with the resources that would be 
misdirected towards financing these acolytes of the president. 




3.9 Parliamentary Oversight of Public Debt and Creation of Provinces 
 
Bill 10 repeals article 62(2) (d) &(e) of the constitution which states that: (a) the National 
Assembly shall oversee the performance of executive functions; (b) Public debt before it is 
contracted; (approve Guarantees on loans contracted by the state institutions or other 
institutions) (c) Approving International Agreements and Treaties before these are acceded 
to or ratified. Instead the amendment provides that: “Cabinet shall accede or ratify or 
withdraw from international agreements and approve loans contracted by the state and 
guarantees on loans contracted by state institutions.” Parliamentary oversight is removed. 
Given Zambia’s debt crisis which is due to irresponsible borrowing, the removal of 
parliamentary oversight is incomprehensible.   
  A further proposed amendment which relates to National Assembly oversight, is 
Article 149 (1) which currently states that the president may, subject to the approval of the 
National Assembly create or divide a province or merge two or more provinces as 
prescribed. In the proposed amendment the phrase “subject to the approval of the National 
Assembly”, is removed and the President under Bill 10 will be able to create provinces 
without any parliamentary or other oversight. 
 
3.10 International Agreements 
 
The proposed amendments repeal article 63 (2) (e) which currently gives the National 
Assembly oversight over approving international agreements and treaties before these are 
acceded to or ratified. Article 92 (2) (c) explains that the President has the power to 
negotiate and sign international agreements and the proposed amendment removes the 
requirement that his or her power be subject to approval by the National Assembly. 
 
3.11 National Assembly Oversight over Appointments Made by the Executive 
 
A proposed amendment of Article 94 of the Constitution also reduces the power of the 
National Assembly to effectively exercise oversight over appointments or measures taken by 
the President. The proposed amendments will allow the executive to act without seeking 
approval of the National Assembly. This is a deliberate attempt to remove parliamentary 
oversight on this important area. With the amendment, where the National Assembly rejects 
the appointment for the third time that measure or appointment shall take effect. 
 
3.12 Disciplinary Actions against Judges and the Judiciary 
 
International and regional standards establish that judges may only be dismissed on serious 
grounds of misconduct or incompetence, in accordance with fair procedures ensuring 
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objectivity and impartiality set out in the constitution. To ensure the independence of the 
judiciary, such disciplinary proceedings must be held by an institution independent of the 
executive. The current Article 143(a) provides that a judge may be removed from office on 
the following grounds: (a) mental or physical disability that makes the judge incapable of 
performing judicial functions; (b) incompetence; (c) gross misconduct; or (d) bankruptcy. 
The amendment Bill replaces “mental or physical disability that makes the judge incapable 
of performing judicial function”, with “legally disqualified from performing judicial function.” 
What does “legally disqualified” in this context mean? The provision is vague. It exists in no 
other constitution in the world. The vagueness of the provision increases the risk of judges 
being removed on politically motivated grounds and threatens the rule of law and separation 
of powers. 
This development comes in combination with a proposed amendment to Article 114 
transferring the ultimate decision to remove a judge from the judicial Complaints 
Commission to a Tribunal Appointed by the President (new article 44 (3)). Regarding the 
Constitutional Court, the amendment removes the positions of the President and Deputy 
President without clearly specifying where the powers of the two are to rest in their absence. 
In addition, the requirement of a sitting bench of at least 11 judges on the Supreme Court 
and constitutional court is replaced with the vague notion of simply requiring “an even 
number of judges, as prescribed.” This opens up an avenue through which the judiciary could 
be manipulated by the executive. To avoid the possibility of such an outcome, the number of 
judges in the highest courts should be “rigid” and should not be subject to change except 
through legislation. This is particularly important as an independent judiciary is 
indispensable to constitutional democracy.  
 
3.13 Amendments Relating to Elections 
 
Article 81 (3) provides that the President may dissolve parliament if the Executive cannot 
effectively govern the Republic of Zambia due to the failure of the National Assembly to 
objectively and reasonably carry out its legislative function. This is a most unusual provision 
and clearly sends the message that the Executive is superior to Parliament. How can the 
executive be the determinant as to whether parliament is performing its duties or not? What 
does “reasonable” in this context mean? This provision erodes the independence of 
parliament. The only control, in the exercise of this power, by the president is that he or she 
shall inform the public and refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for review. 
  In Article 9, Bill 10 provides that the constitution is amended to repeal Article 51 and 
the substitution thereof of the following: (2) Elections to the National Assembly shall be 
conducted under a mixed member electoral system as prescribed. This is an attempt to 
introduce proportional representation. No details are given as to how this complicated 
system of elections is going to be implemented. Countries that have proportional 
representation have detailed provisions in the constitution as to how lists of candidates are 
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to be made and the threshold for getting a seat. Article 9, gives the impression of an 
inadequately thought out provision. 
  Bill 10 proposes to amend the constitution by repealing the current Article 68 and the 
substitution of the following: “subject to Article 47, the election, nomination, qualification 
and vacation of office of a Member of Parliament shall be as prescribed.” These are matters 
which are so fundamental to constitutional democracy that they should be dealt with in the 
constitution. The qualifications for election to parliament and the presidency are important 
constitutional questions. They are never left to parliament to decide. It is quite clear that the 
intention of Bill 10 is to give the ruling party the power to determine who can stand for 
President and parliament.  By leaving election matters to Parliament, they also seek to 
redraw the electoral map of Zambia so that constituencies are increased in areas where the 
ruling party has majority voters, thereby ensuring a permanent majority in parliament. This 
fits into the overall objective of Bill 10 to constitutionalise dictatorship and ensure the ruling 
party rule in perpetuity. 
A further Amendment in Bill 10 states that “Article 116 (3) is amended so that a 
Minister will continue to hold office until the next general election.” This is clearly a reaction 
to the Constitutional Court judgment that held that Ministers who continued to hold on to 
office in the last election, violated the constitution and must pay back all emoluments earned 
during that period. This is clearly so that Ministers can use government resources to 
campaign for elections in the 2021 elections. 
 
3.14 Coalition Government 
 
Bill 10 proposes to introduce a coalition form of government to govern the country in 
situations provided by Bill 10.  It provides that: “The candidate with the highest votes cast 
shall, within fourteen days of the declaration by the Returning Officer of the Presidential 
election results negotiate and form a coalition government with a presidential candidate that 
participated in the initial ballot, except that the combined votes of that presidential 
candidate and the preferred candidate forming the coalition government meet the threshold 
of more than fifty percent of the valid votes cast.” The first observation to be made is that 
this sort of provision does not exist anywhere else in the world. Presidential candidates 
stand as individual candidates. Their votes cannot be transferred to another candidate at the 
behest of another candidate. The provision is ill conceived and is designed to undermine 
democratic elections. In presidential elections, citizens vote for an individual, not the party. 
The amendment does not deal with the issue of the Vice President, who under the 
constitution is a running mate. So, which of the running mates of the two presidential 
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4. Basic Structure Doctrine and Constitutional Amendments 
 
In conclusion, the paper argues that the proposed amendments are unconstitutional and 
violate the basic structure of the constitution. Most of the amendments contained in Bill 10 
are about removing parliamentary oversight over the executive and subjecting the judiciary 
to executive control, thereby seeking to alter the basic structure of the 2016 Zambian 
constitution and completely missing the objectives of the post 1998 constitutional project in 
Zambia. In addition, the reduction of Parliament’s powers goes against Article 27 of the 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which states that “in order to 
advance political, economic and social governance, state parties shall commit themselves to 
strengthening the capacity of parliaments and legally recognized political parties to perform 
their core functions.” (2007) 
The basic structure doctrine is a constitutional principle developed by the Indian 
Supreme Court and now followed in many parts of the world. It proceeds on the basis that a 
constitution has basic features that cannot be altered through amendment by parliament. It 
was first elaborated in 1964 by Justice J.R. Mudhoikar in his dissent in Sajjan Sigh v. State of 
Rajasthan (1964). The basic structure of the 2016 Zambian constitution are the following 
principles: (a) supremacy of parliament; (b) republican and democratic form of government; 
(c) secular part of the constitution and (d) the separation of powers between the legislature, 
executive, and the judiciary. 
In 1973 the basic structure doctrine triumphed in Justice Han’s Khanna’s judgment in 
the landmark case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) which held: “While 
Parliament has wide powers to amend the constitution, it did not have the power to destroy 
or emasculate the basic elements or fundamental features of the constitution.” Subsequent 
cases have upheld the doctrine. See Indira Nehru Ghandi v. Rajnarain (1975). The basic 
structure doctrine has been adopted in Bangladesh, Anwar Hussain v. Chowdharay (1989). 
The article will end its discussion with a highly relevant quote from Nelson Mandela (1994) 
who I believe is the greatest democrat the world has ever seen. He said: “People come and 
Go. Customs, fashions and preferences change. Yet the web of fundamental rights and justice 
which a nation proclaims, must not be broken. It is the task of the court to ensure that the 
values of freedom and equality which underlie the Constitution are nurtured and protected 
so that they may endure. Constitutionalism means that no office and no institution can be 
higher that the law. The highest and the most humble in the land all, without exception, owe 
allegiance to the same document, the same principles. The authority of government comes 
from the people through the constitution. The people speak through the constitution.” 
Bill 10 is about reducing parliamentary oversight over the Presidency. It is about 
rendering the checks and balances and the other branches of government powerless. It is a 
stealth attempt to privatise the Zambian nation through the office of the Executive. This 
attempt has no redeeming feature because it is prima facie mala fides (in bad faith). The 
Constitution of Zambia has noted imperfections, but any attempt to amend it, should be in 
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the overall interest of democracy, justice, peace, accountability, and fundamental freedoms. 
To tinker it in order to expropriate the state or create a “democratic dictatorship” cannot be 
in the best interest of our beloved country. “History could not be any clearer: Rights given by 
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